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Abstract: Lake et al. underrate both the promise and the limitations of 
contemporary deep learning techniques. The promise lies in combining 
those techniques with broad multisensory training as experienced by 
infants and children. The limitations lie in the need for such systems to 
possess functional subsystems that generate, monitor and switch goals and 
strategies in the absence of human intervention. 
 
Lake et al. present a credible case for why natural intelligence requires the 
construction of compositional, causal generative models that incorporate 
intuitive psychology and physics. Several of their arguments (e.g., for 
compositionality and theory construction, and for learning from limited 
experience) echo arguments that have been made throughout the history of 
cognitive science (e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). Indeed, in the context of Lake et 
al.’s criticisms the closing remarks of Fodor and Pylyshyn’s seminal critique of 
1980s-style connectionism make sobering reading: “some learning is a kind of 
theory construction … We seem to remember having been through this argument 
before. We find ourselves with a gnawing sense of deja vu” (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 
1988, p. 69). It would appear that cognitive science has advanced little in the last 
30 years with respect to the underlying debates. 
 
Yet Lake et al. underrate both the promise and the limitations of contemporary 
deep learning (DL) techniques with respect to natural and artificial intelligence. 
While contemporary DL approaches to, say, learning and playing Atari games, 
undoubtedly employ psychologically unrealistic training regimes and are 
undoubtedly inflexible with respect to changes to the reward/goal structure, to 
fixate on these limitations overlooks the promise of such approaches. It is clear 
the DL nets are not normally trained with anything like the experiences had by 
the developing child, whose learning is based on broad multisensory experience 
and is cumulative with new motor and cognitive skills building on old (Vygotsky, 
1978). Until DL nets are trained in this way it is not reasonable to critique the 
outcomes of such approaches for unrealistic training regimes, of, for example, 
“almost 500 times as much experience as the human received” (Lake et al., p. 17), 
for that 500 times as much experience neglects the prior experience that the 
human brought to the task. DL networks (as currently organised) require that 
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much experience precisely because they bring nothing but a learning algorithm 
to the task. 
 
A more critical question is whether contemporary DL approaches, might, with 
appropriate training, be able to acquire intuitive physics – the kind of thing an 
infant learns through their earliest interactions with the world (that there are 
solids and liquids, and that solids can be grasped and that some can be picked up, 
but that they fall when dropped, etc.). Similarly can DL acquire intuitive 
psychology through interaction with other agents? And what kind of input 
representations and motor abilities might allow DL networks to develop 
representational structures that support reuse across tasks? The promise of DL 
networks (and at present it remains a promise) is that, with sufficiently broad 
training, they may support the development of systems that capture intuitive 
physics and intuitive psychology. To neglect this possibility is to see the glass as 
half empty, rather than half full. 
 
The suggestion is not simply that training an undifferentiated DL network with 
the ordered multisensory experiences of a developing child will automatically 
yield an agent with natural intelligence. As Lake et al. note, gains come from 
combining DL with reinforcement learning (RL) and Monte Carlo Tree Search to 
support extended goal-directed activities (such as playing Atari games) and 
problem solving (as in the game of Go). These extensions are of particular 
interest because they parallel cognitive psychological accounts of more complex 
cognition. More specifically, accounts of behaviour generation and regulation 
have long distinguished between automatic and deliberative behaviour. Thus, 
the contention scheduling / supervisory system theory of Norman and Shallice 
(1986) proposes that one system – the contention scheduling system – controls 
routine, over-learned, or automatic behaviour, while a second system – the 
supervisory system – may bias or modulate the contention scheduling system in 
non-routine situations where deliberative control is exercised. Within this 
account the routine system may plausibly employ a DL-type network combined 
with (a hierarchical variant of) model-free reinforcement learning, while the 
non-routine system is more plausibly conceived of in terms of a model-based 
system (cf. Daw et al., 2005). 
 
Viewing DL-type networks as models of the contention scheduling system 
suggests that their performance should be compared to those aspects of expert 
performance that are routinized or over-learned. From this perspective, the 
limits of DL-type networks are especially informative as they indicate which 
cognitive functions cannot be routinized and should be properly considered as 
supervisory. Indeed, classical model-based RL is impoverished compared to 
natural intelligence. The evidence from patient and imaging studies suggests that 
the non-routine system is not an undifferentiated whole, as might befit a system 
that simply performs Monte Carlo Tree Search. The supervisory system appears 
to perform a variety of functions such as goal generation (to create one’s own 
goals and to function in real domains outside of the laboratory), strategy 
generation and evaluation (to create and evaluate potential strategies that might 
achieve goals), monitoring (to detect when one’s goals are frustrated, and to 
thereby trigger generation of new plans/strategies or new goals), switching (to 
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allow changing goals), response inhibition (to prevent selection of prepotent 
actions which may conflict with one’s high-level goals), and perhaps others. (See 
Shallice & Cooper, 2011, for an extended review of relevant evidence, and Fox et 
al., 2013, and Cooper, 2016, for detailed suggestions for the potential 
organisation of higher-level modulatory systems.) These functions must also 
support creativity and autonomy, as expressed by naturally intelligent systems. 
Furthermore “exploration” is not unguided as in the classical exploration / 
exploitation trade-off of RL. Natural intelligence appears to combine the largely 
reactive perception-action cycle of RL with a more active action-perception cycle, 
in which the cognitive system can act and deliberatively explore in order to test 
hypotheses. 
 
To achieve natural intelligence it is likely that a range of supervisory functions 
will need to be incorporated into the model-based system or as modulators of a 
model-free system. Identifying the component functions and their interactions, 
i.e., identifying the functional architecture (Newell, 1990), will be critical if we 
are to move beyond Lake et al.’s “character” and “frostbite” challenges, which 
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